U.S nuclear weapon policy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

U.S nuclear branch policy - Essay ExampleU.S nuclear weapon policyThe reasons for retaining a triad, a product of very conservative estimates of what would be required to cope with a disarming Soviet first strike, are not discussed officially. The assumption is that a floor exists beneath which U.S. forces cannot be allowed to fall, but this minimum level is not necessarily determined by targeting doctrine or the political goals that the doctrine is meant to uphold.The question of which countries the United States allow target with nuclear weapons in the future and under what circumstances is simply not articulated and certainly not clearly understood. According to some officials, this question does not require an a priori answer. The preponderance of U.S. strategic forces remains targeted at the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, considered an unvarying imperative. Despite an agreement reached for the two sides to retarget their forces away from one anothers territories a symbolic ste p it is emphasized repeatedly by defense officials that weapons could be rapidly retargeted if necessary. The targeting look into conducted by the Bush administration purportedly generated plans that provided for flexible options for global application, including the ability to retarget weapons quickly to meet any contingency. More recently, plans have been discussed to target three dry land countries with highly accurate conventional forces as well. The vanishing Cold War nuclear order was the product of a need to deter aggression against NATO by A-one Warsaw Pact conventional forces. NATO members were unwilling or unable to dedicate sufficient resources or to take the necessary steps to restructure their defense sectors to discipline the disparities in conventional capabilities. Nuclear weapons were a cheap way of maintaining a military balance. Outside of NATO, nuclear guarantees were extended very selectively to close U.S. ally who confronted proximate enemies allied with o r part of the Soviet bloc. Insofar as these arrangements were considered legitimate, it was as part of a bipolar system in which the United States, Europe, and a few other allies were united in a defensive alliance, while the Soviet Union was seen as an expansionist power bent on global hegemony.With the exception of Russia and China, the current nuclear threat, to the extent it can be reliably defined, consists of a handful of states with small or fledgling programs and sometimes bonnie immodest ambitions. This is not to belittle the dangers such states may pose to international or regional stability in the future. But the sudden elevation of third world powers to the status of ruthless enemies on a par with the Soviet Union bears further examination, especially since it is now becoming a principal principle for retaining a U.S. nuclear deterrent. Part of the logic of this argument hinges on the notion that the Soviet Union was rational, valued its survival, and could be targete d effectively, whereas the nuclear powers of the future probably will not share these traits. Now this may questioned Will our nuclear adversaries always be rational, or at least operate with the same logic as we do We cant be sure. Will we always be able to put our adversaries at risk to make deterrence work Not necessarily, particularly with terrorists whom we may not even be able to find. But if one is going to make the argument that U.S. strategy falls apart in the face of a third world